Rule Interpretations and Tactics for NHWC Battles

Links This page forms something of a supplement to the rules, as that page being intended as the basic guide to play and because I'm not going to put every exception and idea in the rules where, historical precedent, common sense or logic provides ready answers. All of the points below have arisen during campaign battles where the umpire has to implement players' orders in every kind of circumstance not necessarily given black-and-white coverage in the rules. These apply to the 1812 and Eylau campaigns run previously, but are intended for other umpires and any one-off wargames where the players agree to use them. Apart from that, these are my own interpretations, do not form part of the rules (though some of the rules are included in them) and may change from time to time.

Orders given by players have a far greater chance of being carried out if they conform to a currently effective battle plan. This should be drawn up at the start of the battle (usually some hours before in reality) and may be modified and re-issued at any time for one or more formations or for the entire force involved in the battle.
Units without a plan to work to, or being given orders contrary to the plan, are tested by a simple die roll to see whether they carry out what they are now being told to do. They may comply with some delay, which is in addition to the time taken for the orders to reach them.
It is quite possible, though hardly advisable, for a battle to be fought with one set of orders and no further intervention from any commander. At least, a plan or current set of orders allows units to continue the action as intended even if the player cannot for a turn or two.

Specific orders for units with a leader present have a better chance of being carried out than if without a leader, that chance diminishing with distance from the player's location and the number of steps down the chain of command. This allows a leader to digress from the plan for a particular, unforeseen, purpose on a short term basis. Reaction to enemy action is not subject to these command restrictions and in fact tends to override players' orders and intentions (e.g. units do not ignore and move past enemy to a flank unless that enemy is being engaged by another friendly force).

Skirmishers are not the go-anywhere-do-anything suicidal commandos of the original BG game. In fact, they are rather weak and tend to seek cover or protection from their formed units when threatened. Marshes do not provide cover and buildings very little. Stacking more than 50 in the open is not allowed, as I don't feel I need to give way to the lobby of those who think skirmishers formed as dense formations as open order battalions. One element per hex means 50 or more are possible when the drill book formation was 40 per 100m, which is enough of a margin of overcrowding.

Disrupted skirmishers, those without ammunition or close to being surrounded move to cover or to their parent units, as per the rules. Skirmishers low on ammunition tend to be relatively cautious and will retire if it is prudent. Those recombining with their units to refill their pouches or recover fatigue are not able to split off again in the same turn. Light infantry can send out another company in the same move provided they maintain the strength of the parent unit given in the rules.

The "unit", infantry battalion, cavalry regiment and gun battery, is the level at which the game is set and I interpret it as such. Separated skirmishers recombine if in a hex with their parent unit. As stated above, weakened, disrupted or threatened sub-units remain in or go to cover or move to the rear of friendly units, or rejoin their own unit, whichever seems most appropriate in the circumstances. I do not consider the game mechanism of not allowing recovery of fatigue in turns when skirmishers have rejoined as a reason for them not to do so. If a battalion is active in this way then that is a consequence of them using skirmishers. Simply not carrying out the action in order to gain from a game program loophole is gamesmanship, not Napoleonic tactics.

Cavalry piquets were brought in to allow this important element of tactics and means of observation to be used, but in some cases it seems to have governed the actions of units rather than being a small part of their capability. They were mostly used before or on the periphery of battles.
Separated elements are treated as skirmishing cavalry if they are separated from each other and larger units by at least three hexes, to a flank or in front. So placing individual squadrons into the gaps between units, much less in the same hex, is not piqueting and such squadrons will be required to act as part of their parent unit.
Cavalry fire capability is intended for squadrons qualifying as piquets, though it is possible for a regiment with specific orders to use carbines (and pistols, blunderbuss and bows in certain cases!). I see fire combat as an alternative to cold steel, which means that a unit is incapable of charging, including counter-charging, in the same turn as firing. Naturally, therefore, a unit required to charge cannot fire. I see this provision as being for regiments forced to defend a position or taking advantage of a particular terrain feature when charging into the open would be the less sensible option.
Generally, once a formation of cavalry is engaged, only squadrons completely separate from it, in front or on the flanks, and with orders to act as piquets are treated as such.

Line formation for infantry seems to be avoided and I often see units I have made form line reformed into column by players for no apparent reason. Perhaps this is in response to the cliché of column tactics being used by the French (and Russians), line only by the British. Columns were of course used by all armies, but the tactic demonstrated most was advance or movement to a position in column followed by deployment into line either for defence or assault. The reason for this was that the musket, not the bayonet, was the primary arm of all infantry. 'Melee' combat rarely took place and a charge to contact (or more often to force the enemy away to avoid contact), if made at all, would usually follow several volleys from the unit formed in line. A look at the fire factors in the game shows how much of a waste firing in column is and why line formation was used. Line is of course also less vulnerable to artillery fire.
Infantry tend to form line unless specifically ordered, or there is a reason not to, and tend not to fire when in column. Reasons for staying in column can include not being in close action yet, so remaining ready to move, or being required to move again in the near future (one or two turns) in or entering close terrain. Keeping battalions in column to take advantage of the ability of three units in a hex to fire is pointless and wasting ammunition, because their fire will never equal that of a good line, and gamesmanship rather than tactics. This applies to most attacking units as well as defenders.

Fire combat differs between the two fire phases. We have always worked to the idea of the defensive fire phase being for close range, self-defence or close support of adjacent units against imminent attack and that its use denotes rapid fire. DF fire is therefore restricted to units in formations designed to maximise fire power and against targets posing a threat. Fire is directed preferentially against easier targets in cases where more than one target is otherwise equally available.
This means that infantry will mostly fire at enemies in adjacent hexes, unless supporting a neighbouring unit with an adjacent enemy, or at two hexes range if armed with rifles. Artillery will be free to choose suitable targets at up to one third their maximum range but will not fire at unlimbered artillery or skirmishers in the DF phase. Infantry in column, low on ammunition or disrupted are less likely to fire unless their situation is particularly desperate. Infantry in good order, in line and skirmisher formation, may fire at long range targets in the open. If artillery ammunition falls below one round per remaining turn per battery (one third the battery's own supply if manually recorded), guns will not fire in the DF phase unless directly threatened.

The idea of being engaged by the enemy is important. This means that a unit under fire, or coming under fire next phase, tends to fire back at its assailant and not at another target. This fits with the rule of firing at the nearest or most threatening target: 500 musket balls coming in your direction is more threatening than most things, even on a battlefield.
A result of this approach is that several units abreast or in a stack facing several similar enemy units fire on a one-to-one basis and do not concentrate their fire on one target in order to break the enemy one unit at a time.

FlanksOutflanking cannot take place in the middle of a continuous line where a potentially outflanking unit is being engaged by an enemy other than that which it could outflank. It helps in interpreting this by thinking of the units, not as rigid separate blocks confined to 60º angles, but as flexible bodies of men capable of refusing one or more companies, following terrain, covering each other's flanks and forming a continuous line.
In the situation depicted here, the Russian unit C is not being taken in the flank, because the French unit 4 is engaged against unit D. To allow C to be attacked in the left flank ignores the influence and realistic position of D. Similarly, unit 5 is not outflanked because unit D is mutually engaged against unit 4. Unit E can be attacked in the flank because there is no other unit to stop the French unit 6 from doing so. In reality, unit C should be aligned horizontally and linked to B and D, it is only the hex grid system that prevents this.
The idea is to encourage wider manoeuvres and discourage use of the 60º facing increments of the hex grid as an excuse for 'flanking' attacks. Salients like the Russian one above are vulnerable to artillery fire and can be exposed by the shoulders (units A and E) being attacked.

Morale in basic BG wargames is a case of units' reaction to events. In reality units would 'test morale' in anticipation of events also. A unit being ordered to attack, or to defend in the face of long odds, has its morale tested in much the same way as the game automatically does on other occasions. This uses a notional D6 against the unit quality, with various other factors taken into account, such as the presence of a leader, whether they or the enemy are disrupted, comparative strengths, what they can see of the situation they are in or will be in if manoeuvring as ordered, etc. We cannot make rout or disruption result from these tests, but units will not always do as asked and may do something else, especially if there is a combination of circumstances against them.

Leaders in the Napoleonic wars did just that: led, and from the front too. There seem to be a lot of occasions in wargames where leaders stand in the rear of their formations or run around the rear area chasing routed or disrupted units. While this is arguably possible (but still wrong) if the formation is not closely engaged, I do not know of any history telling of brigades going into action with their commander anywhere but at the head of his troops when possible. I do not believe it was common for, and know no example of, a general officer cowering in the rear or running off several hundred metres to rally a unit while the rest of the brigade is toe to toe with the enemy. The nature of communications on a Napoleonic battlefield would require a general to be among the units most closely engaged: the only way to have his orders known would be to be from the front where unit commanders and their men could see him. I would have thought that the combat bonus given by a leader would encourage a realistic approach in this, but not always, it seems.
Divisional commanders I can see placing themselves perhaps between a leading and reserve wave or position, but not to the rear of every unit in the division (unless they are in a single line - rare and unwise tactics). Corps commanders would almost certainly also lead their formation forward, though they might also allow a leading sub-formation to pass while they took up a more central command position.
Players ordering units forward while their own or subordinate command figures head in the opposite direction, or stand and watch, will find their orders seldom obeyed.

Rallying of routed units should therefore be the job of higher commanders with not much else to do or for brigade and division commanders whose formations are not in close action. Players will not be able to dictate the movement of routing units, but they can indicate their intention to follow and rally them by having a leader follow the routers' to their current position.
Routing units will always move towards or along the line of communication, regardless of whether this gets in the way of other units' movement.

Visibility is assessed on the basis of what units and/or their commanders can see, not what the game presents to the players. Orders to move to or attack an unseen location or enemy are tested by roll of dice, as are attempts to get units from different formations or out of sight of each other to carry out a coordinated move or assault.

Pioneers, sappers, etc. are not combat units and will not be able to manoeuvre around the field like infantry. They have a lower quality than infantry and will test morale if ordered into danger, with a correspondingly low chance of success. In campaign terms it makes sense to preserve these units, as they are most useful for the building or destroying of bridges and fortifications.
Tactically, they are suitable for the tasks for which they were really used: assaults along with infantry on defences, towns, obstacles and bridges or the defence of these, of guns or supply trains. Players who depend on sappers to form part of a line of battle will tend to find a hole instead.

Fatigue, especially in hot weather, will cause units to become less active, delay their following direct orders and make them prone to fail to respond to a player's wishes. Units will have their fatigue taken into account when testing to see if they follow orders - the game already does this for morale tests. The new maximum of 10, when reached, will cause the unit to do nothing or, if directly threatened, move away from the threat towards cover.