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In the previous fifty years, artillery had become one of the main combat arms on the battlefield, a change as much due to the tactics of its use as numbers or quality of equipment. Artillery fire was inaccurate, mostly direct, flat-trajectory, line-of-sight and relatively easily avoided. The only real innovation in materiel was spherical case, or shrapnel, used in limited quantities by the British. At close range fire could be devastating, but batteries were vulnerable to direct assault and had to be sited with care and protected by infantry (more rarely, cavalry) to both survive and have an impact on the battlefield.
Commanders often had little appreciation for the abilities and defects of artillery. Even Napoleon, a gunner by training, failed to grasp the value of reverse-slope fire by howitzers (perhaps just as well, for the game doesn't allow it!), though he did handle guns in mass and with a speed of concentration unequalled in his contemporaries. Wellington had a notorious dislike of gunners and sacked a string of CRAs in Spain, though he was probably right in his assessment of counter-battery fire as a waste of shot, saving ammunition for the better, more immediately threatening targets of massed troops. He also had the tactical sense to keep the bulk of his forces out of view and therefore out of danger from artillery. Archduke Charles did not comprehend the fact that massed formations were very vulnerable to long range artillery fire and Austrian, Russian and other armies continued to deploy in full view.
Battery types
Disregarding siege trains and
regimental guns, extremes of the scale and each used somewhat uniquely,
artillery was a rather homogenous arm of very similar weapons for similar
purposes. The main difference in type was that between horse and foot artillery,
but this was principally one of mobility (the guns themselves being much the same in
both branches) leading one to generally act in company with cavalry and the
other with infantry or in a more static role.
British artillery all used 6pdr
and 9pdr guns, French horse artillery used 8pdr and later 4pdr, with the 6pdr
replacing both from around 1810. Russian light foot and horse artillery both
used 6pdrs, while their heavy, 12pdr, batteries were rather appropriately termed
'position' batteries. Austrian 'cavalry batteries' were not horse artillery
in the same way as those of other armies, with gunners riding on the pieces
rather than their own horses, making the whole rather less mobile than true
horse batteries and considerably less so than cavalry.
Foot artillery could be further categorised, in modern terms, as direct support, belonging to brigades or divisions, and general support at corps level. They both used the same weapons, though with a tendency for heavier types at higher level, and were increasingly used in the same way. All but 18 of the 60 guns in the French grand battery at Waterloo were 6pdrs, with the remainder 12pdrs from the three corps' reserves (and 20 howitzers, two in each battery). Russian light batteries, however, were kept close to the infantry of the division, there being three infantry brigades and two batteries per division, which made this arrangement easy to keep to if one brigade was the divisional reserve without guns.
Fire effect
The effect of different sizes of artillery was very similar against troops in the open, as a 6lb shot would kill or maim just as well as a 12lb one. Even effective range was more often limited by visibility and terrain than the theoretical range of each weapon. The mean effective range, from a contemporary treatise, for both 12pdr and 8pdr was given as 800-900m; for 6pdrs 600-700m; 4pdrs, 500-600m was considered effective; 400-500m for howitzers. Another source gives 800m and 900m for smaller and larger types of howitzer respectively.
Roundshot could reach much greater ranges, but the accuracy of smooth-bore weapons fell off greatly and seeing its effect, and therefore whether adjustments were required by those firing, was far more difficult at longer range. Also, longer range required elevation of the gun barrel: a 12pdr could reach 2400 paces (2000m) but only if the elevation was 5 degrees above horizontal. For weapons dependent upon horizontal penetration and ricochet for their effect, elevation of much more than one degree was detrimental to results.
Soft ground, deep snow, vegetation and obstacles would also reduce fire effect, with projectiles being buried or stopped short and explosions muffled.
Deployment and use
The increase in effectiveness in the 18th century, including standardisation, greater manoeuvrability and regular organisation, led to changes in use up to and during the Napoleonic wars. Desultory preliminary bombardments gave way to planned, sustained massed-battery preparations; sporadic support from fixed positions was replaced by combined arms operations with artillery permanently part of infantry and cavalry formations. Movement and positioning were now keys to the effective use of artillery, both in defence and attack.
When used to support or prepare for an offensive, artillery was best massed immediately opposite the point to be attacked, though where possible enfilading or crossfire would be used. The main target to be chosen was close-formed troops: fire at artillery batteries was generally so ineffective as to be considered a waste of shot. Defending artillery would be unable to maintain its position once its own supporting troops were disrupted by fire and defeated by an attack. Preparation for and support of that attack was therefore the more effective means of employing guns.
Defensively, artillery might be distributed more along the line, with a considerable reserve to form a massed battery at any point found to be vulnerable and in need of bolstering in defence, or for preparatory fire for a counter-attack. If possible, guns would be dug in, though hedges, walls and ditches would serve as extemporary protection of various degrees. When placed in defence of a defile such as a bridge, guns would not be more than 300m from it so they could rake it effectively with canister. They would not be deployed on the far side, to avoid any danger of being cut off should the defile fall into enemy hands.
When defending a village artillery was usually set to one side, or behind it if a suitable overlooking position was available. Very rarely were guns placed in a village because of the lack of space for, and the danger of buildings catching fire to, the guns, gunners and ammunition. Churchyards or other walled spaces were favoured, as long as a route of escape was readily available. In BG game terms, placing a battery in a village facing into an open hex would represent lining the edge of the built-up area and is therefore possible, but not recommended. Placing guns in a village, forest or other obstructed hex and facing another obstructed one is most unrealistic. It must be remembered that for each gun or howitzer at least two vehicles would be present to its rear, the limber and ammunition wagons.
Economy of ammunition was vital and fire should never be opened unless worthwhile targets could effectively be engaged. Each gun was ordered to keep at least four canister rounds as a last reserve to use against enemy infantry or cavalry at close range.
For mutual support, batteries would be ideally 500m, and no more than 800m, apart. Infantry or cavalry would always be placed to protect the guns from sudden rush attacks or from close-range sniping by skirmishers.
An artillery reserve would be maintained at corps level, for which horse artillery were well suited though 12pdrs were commonly kept to this role. This reserve was to be rapidly deployed to wherever needed according to the corps commander's orders.
Deployment of ammunition wagons occurred in two halves: one with the limbers (or the limbers themselves if they carried ammunition, such as the British did), 20m to the rear of the guns (in the same hex); the remainder a few hundred metres to the rear in a place covered from enemy fire.
If awaiting an enemy attack, it was best to hold most of the artillery concealed until the troops had approached to within 1100m. The guns would then be directed to advance to the most advantageous positions to engage them from less than 1000m. In flat, open country a battery might open fire at greater ranges, but only at particularly good targets. In a prepared position, gunners would measure ranges to landmarks within their field of fire - prominent trees, bridges, buildings, etc. in the absence of which stakes could be set in the ground at given ranges. This enabled accurate fire to be opened immediately, with less need for adjustments than if the range was purely estimated.
Target selection
It was seen as bad tactics to use guns for counter-battery fire unless at very close range or there was a specific reason for it. The effect of shot and shell on such difficult targets made it not worth the expenditure of ammunition. The game mechanics give a fairly good reflection of this, with relatively little damage being possible to guns. Canister at close range would be more effective, but canister was only about 25% of a battery's supply and would be kept for more urgent self defence. Also, if guns were moved to get within canister range they would be vulnerable to the same in return and to enemy counterattacks, and guns were too valuable for this risk usually.
Many commanders gave strict instructions against counter-battery fire. Mercer at Waterloo came to regret breaching this when he fired at a French battery and suffered their return fire for some time. Notably, the French fire had little physical effect on his battery, as you might expect, but being under such fire and knowing you have brought it on yourself would be distasteful to say the least. One can assume that neither Mercer not the French gunners had any other suitable target at that time.
Counter-battery fire was so ineffective because so many of the shot would pass between or over the guns, as the gaps would comprise about half the total frontage and the target was not deep being a single line, though limbers and other vehicles to the rear could and did suffer also. A close-formed unit close in rear of a battery would therefore suffer this fire even if it was specifically intended for the guns. Coupled with the tactic of firing at other troops in preference to artillery, the infantry are the obvious target.
Smoothbore weapons had an area-fire effect, aim at a specific point or unit was seldom used at any but the closest range because it was not worthwhile and not often achievable. Artillery and infantry tended to fire rather blindly to their front, using what glimpses they might get through the smoke to take a general aim, but effectively sweeping the area between them and the nearest or most dangerous enemy they could see. This is of course the main reason why units cannot fire 'through' or over other friendly units.
Artillery in the advance
Cavalry making a successful attack would have any artillery operating with them advance to engage enemy guns at close range, to prevent them coming to bear on the victorious cavalry's flanks as it moved on in pursuit or exploitation of the success. If their own cavalry was defeated the artillery's role was reversed and their task would be to fire into the enemy's flanks.
When the infantry advanced, the guns allocated for close support advanced with them, half firing and half advancing by turns. At 1100m from the enemy line the guns were trotted out to 100m ahead of the advancing infantry and opened fire. Alternate fire and movement would maintain this 100m advanced position until 350m from the enemy, when the guns would await the infantry. At this range, if no effective enemy artillery was encountered the guns would concentrate on the defending infantry; if however enemy artillery was a serious hazard to the attack, they would concentrate on silencing the artillery first. If regimental pieces were included, these would engage defending infantry while the larger pieces fired at the artillery. If the enemy was in column, being perhaps just deploying or preparing to withdraw, the artillery were to advance as quickly as possible and engage from less than 500m with roundshot, this being more destructive in these circumstances than canister.
Artillery in the withdrawal
It was the task of the artillery to keep firing until they could no longer be of use to their own troops but with an eye to their own safety and ability to escape. The battery withdrew using fire and movement as described above. If, due to the effects of enemy fire, horses or wheels were in short supply, ammunition wagons and other vehicles would be left behind in preference to guns. Abandoned ammunition could be left with a burning fuse in the wagon so it would blow up rather than fall into enemy hands. If a gun had to be abandoned it would first be 'spiked', with a soft metal spike hammered into the touchhole, making further use impossible until overhauled by a workshop.
Sources
Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, 1978/1997
von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic Era, 1979
Adkin, The Waterloo Companion, 2001
Black, European Warfare 1660-1815, 1994
