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Cavalry Tactics

Cavalry on the battlefield

Like infantry and artillery, cavalry was divided into several distinct types, with a confusing array of titles which often tell one little about the type of cavalry in question. Light cavalry (hussars, light dragoons, uhlans, lancers, Chasseurs, chevaux legeres) were designed for reconnaissance, foraging, patrolling, screening and pursuit. Though they could be used for shock action this would be as an expedient and yielding secondary results. Generally, heavy cavalry played their major part on the battlefield, light cavalry in campaigning before and after battle, while dragoons could take on either role as required. See also the page on piquets and other light cavalry roles.

Heavy cavalry (carabiniers, cuirassiers, horse grenadiers, gendarmes and some nations' dragoons) were bigger men on heavier mounts, the first two named wearing breastplates and, usually, backplates. They were specifically for shock action and seldom used for other duties. In 1812, Napoleon reorganised his cavalry corps to include squadrons of light cavalry in each heavy division in order to relieve the heavies of any need to carry out non-combat tasks and to save them for their specialist role - the charge. In some armies, such as the British, dragoons were the only heavy cavalry and are treated as such because they were mounted, trained and behaved like the heavies of other armies, whereas French dragoons were much more akin to light cavalry and mounted on small horses.

Due to the cost of cavalry and their susceptibility to the rigours of campaigning, the proportion of cavalry to other arms was never great and, as the size of armies increased, this proportion diminished. A century earlier, Marlborough would have 20-40% of his forces as cavalry (almost none of it truly light cavalry), Frederick the Great's armies had between 23% and 42%, but Napoleon at Austerlitz reached only the lower of these figures. After Russia, the French might only field 5-10% of their forces as cavalry. Wellington had an average of 12% cavalry in the Peninsula, due in part to the poor foraging in Spain and difficulties in transporting horses thither. This paucity of cavalry meant that they had to be used with care and the needs of the campaign as a whole in mind. Throwing cavalry into action without thought for their own safety merely to overrun some guns or scatter some skirmishers would be frowned upon by any cavalry commander. The only charge a regiment was really good for was its first of the day, so this would be chosen and executed with good preparation and control. After a charge, cavalry would usually have to spend some time recovering and would seldom be as effective even if losses were light.

The diminished numbers of, particularly, heavy cavalry belied a continued conservatism in reliance on what was something of an outmoded arm. Long before the Napoleonic wars, cavalry were shown to be vulnerable and stoppable by well-handled infantry (Fontenoy 1745) and could be chased off by fire and a determined advance (Falkirk 1746, Minden 1759). Cavalry had to be opportunistic, picking its moment with care, for success against anything but a broken or isolated enemy was far from assured. Repeatedly infantry, properly handled, showed that they had little to fear from cavalry, exemplified at Waterloo when the French cavalry returning were seen as a release from the artillery bombardment that preceded and followed their several and ineffective visits to the allied squares. The true worth of cavalry was the threat it posed to an enemy disrupted and defeated by infantry and artillery and the reaction this created, fixing at least part of the threatened force so that a combined arms attack could wreak that disruption and defeat. Throwing cavalry against a formed and prepared enemy was an extreme and desperate measure or a mistake.

Cavalry weapons

Despite their diverse types, cavalry equipment differed little. All troopers carried a sabre, usually a lighter, curved weapon for light cavalry, a heavier, straight-bladed weapon for the heavies. A carbine or 'musketoon' was de rigeur for light cavalry, useful for their skirmishing role and signalling, and most heavy units were also equipped with a similar firearm (true to type, longer and heavier) though its usefulness in action is questionable. Carbines would see most service when in camp or bivouac, for sentry duty and, if necessary, self defence. As even the dragoons, erstwhile mounted infantry, did little or no fighting on foot after 1805, the firearm for heavy cavalry was something of an anachronism. This was perhaps perceived by the Russians who withdrew the carbines from their cuirassiers (though they were re-issued later, so some need for them must have remained). Pistols, carried in holsters astride the saddle pommel, were of very limited worth, more likely to be used for dispatching a wounded horse than any purpose of combat. The most distinctive weapon was the lance, carried by dedicated lancers, uhlans and Cossacks of various designations. Requiring a greater degree of training, the lance was particularly effective in shock action, raising the light cavalry bearing it to something approaching the effectiveness of heavies when charging. In the melee of close action, or close terrain, it could become a liability but as the lancer had a sabre to resort to and the advantages in the charge and pursuit seem to have outweighed these drawbacks, the lancer was definitely an asset to any cavalry arm.

Unit formations

BG only allows one formation for cavalry, but as the game is scaled with regiments as the basic unit this means that all dispositions of squadrons within a regiment are all allowed for. NHWC OOB files use the squadron as the basic unit, so some creation of regimental formations is possible. Cavalry would operate in line, two deep, with a second line of squadrons (often meaning a second regiment) supporting the first. Echelon of squadrons could be used, but was not usually recommended. The overall effect of the regiment in action is what is reflected.

Brigade formations and manoeuvres

A regiment of cavalry should never act alone in battle. The composition of brigades usually ensured that, like infantry, those in close action would have others in support to fall back on or ready to exploit their success.

Against cavalry
A second line of cavalry was to advance 200-250m behind the first, but never at the gallop, with sufficient spaces to allow the first line to retire through it (either hex gaps or in low enough concentrations per hex, in game terms). If the first line had been repelled, the second line was to assault as soon as the first had passed back through them. If the first rank overthrew the enemy cavalry, part of the second would follow in support while the rest exploited any flanks exposed by the enemy withdrawal.

Against infantry
Wherever possible, infantry was to be attacked in flanks or rear, as experience showed that steady infantry could repel a frontal cavalry charge. Successful frontal cavalry action was only possible if the infantry had previously been subject to adequate artillery fire, assault by other troops or if their morale was shaky.
Squadrons would break into a trot at about 600m from the target and into a gallop when within canister range (the 5-minute turn charge bonus of 4 hexes reflects this far better than the 15-minute turn). If one unit broke the enemy line, all others would converge on the gap.

Withdrawal
This was carried out as described for infantry, alternate squadrons or regiments retiring and facing up. Crossing a defile in the face of the enemy would entail units on the flanks crossing first and forming a new line on the far side, those in the centre following last.

Combined arms
One aspect of cavalry consistently underrated in wargames is their threat value, this despite the fact that the term is used in the BG game manual and its effects are described. Some gamers are apt to put infantry into square at the first sight of cavalry, though the rules promote the more realistic option of doing so when the threat is real to any given brigade. The ability of cavalry to threaten action from some distance - up to 800m in one 5-minute turn - is best used in conjunction with other arms, particularly artillery. Infantry forced into square are vulnerable to infantry attack and artillery fire, being less capable of fire combat and themselves more dense targets.

As a massed force of decision, cavalry could still be effective but their intervention, as noted above, had to be timed and positioned with care. Napoleon and his gifted cavalry commanders breathed new life into this role by their organisation and daring use of even quite small numbers of cavalry. A good exposition of this can be found at http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_eylau.html

Unit and sub-unit organisation

1. Carabiniers had six companies, dragoons and hussars variously six or eight companies.
2. One company per regiment was elite, the equivalent to the grenadier company in infantry units.