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Notes to the Napoleonic Game Rules

Linked titles return you to the Rules Page

The rules as such are set in as brief a format as possible for ease of reference. These notes are intended as a read-once-and-file explanation of the rules, along with the rule writers' notes on the background and historical precedent for them.

Any suggested changes to the rules, additions or deletions, will be welcome. Each suggestion should be sent to me and points for and against each rule will be posted on a new page for that purpose. A consensus of opinions will then be sought for the fate of the suggestion(s) to be decided. The rules are not considered to be complete or immutable, in fact as more battles throw up more and more different situations some alterations seem inevitable.

The rules should not constrain players to doing only things that were actually done in the same way as they were done. Scope for experimenting with formations, unit combinations and grand tactics has to be allowed for, provided the principles and spirit of Napoleonic warfare are kept to.

The most important element in a Napoleonic wargame, as in any other, is to have a plan. How a player sets out or words the plan is very much up to them, but it should involve timing each phase of the coming action, with objectives and the means of reaching them down at least to division level, preferably to brigade. Only by a bit of forward planning can co-ordination between formations and arms and their most effective use be achieved.

The objectives set for each formation should be scrutinized for their pertinence to the overall aim of the battle, their historical reality and their achievability. From company to corps, no body of troops should be expected to do the impossible, obviously futile or to commit suicide whatever the potential reward for the rest of the army. If such acts come about by chance and enemy action, c'est la gloire. Most historical examples are seen as blunders of the first water and would not be entered into with prior intent.

It might help to pick aspects of the actual battle being refought, or other Napoleonic actions, and use them in the plan, with perhaps a different sequence or timings from the original. Most real battles can be plundered for ideas at all levels and by this means the actions of units, how they are best supported, how they interact and the effect of the ground they take or hold can be seen and, best for our purposes, applied realistically.

The trouble with having a set of rules that does not specifically ban any but the commonest of possibilities is that some players are inspired to getting all they can out of their most obscure aspects. Put in a rule to cover an eventuality and someone will have half their army following it to the letter as though it was an everyday occurrence in the early nineteenth century. This is not how these rules are intended. From the start, they have been there to guide those players who are unsure of what might be possible in a given situation, rather than conceive of situations because 'it is written' that they are possible. Players are urged to use the rules, and suggest any changes, with this very much in mind.

The strategic situation must also be considered in the drawing up and execution of the plan. Throw everything you have at the enemy, in men, ammunition or materiel, and what happens tomorrow? The victory conditions put an emphasis on the importance of retaining a viable cavalry force and artillery ammunition. What is needed in addition to steps like that is a responsible attitude from the players because in a game where victory is no longer an option, or where it is certain, a player might be tempted to throw in the 'kitchen sink' in the belief that they either can't win or can't lose. In reality an army commander would take every precaution to preserve what is left for the following days and weeks rather than chance all on an all-out desperate measure.

Unfortunately, the BattleGround system allows players to move units around, first-hand and relatively unhindered, just like the counters in a game they really are. The game's morale system is mainly concerned with reaction to events rather than willingness or ability to initiate action. If we want to achieve an historical wargame above and beyond a mere game consideration has to be given to the relationship between the 'war' and the 'game'. We are trying to represent the actions of real people and, while their reaction before going into a situation is not controlled by the electronic program, it must be controlled by us.

The cardinal rule is therefore to play historically, using units as units of men on the ground, not groups of pixels on a screen. All the other rules are adjuncts to this principle, to be used in the light of the overall objective rather than immutable laws in themselves. We do not want to breed barrack-room lawyers or pedants and, if everything is kept in the spirit of the game, we shall not.

The Rule Table, column by column

Stacking

All except cavalry have rows in the table used for operating in the open or in cover. Each of these is further divided into the effects of being in good order and disordered.

The stacking limits should be kept to, though temporary overstacking in advancing after melee or forced retreat may occur, only units up to the stacking limit may fire or otherwise engage in combat.

At one gun per 12m, a battery of effective size will fill a 100m hex sufficiently to prevent another firing alongside. So, while a 100m hex might allow two batteries to unlimber, one would be behind the other and unable to engage but in the way of the first battery's limbers and caissons. Realistically, no two batteries should stay in the same hex because the main reason for their extended spacing was to ensure that ammunition vehicles were sufficiently far apart to prevent catastrophic effects from hits and these vehicles would occupy a considerable portion of the depth of the hex. Russian 12 gun batteries must extend into two hexes at their first opportunity, though if engaging a target which threatens to close with them next turn their defensive fire phases can be used for fire in self-defence until the threat has diminished. In this case the hex into which the battery will extend is considered as being used and fired from: the guns do not unlimber, fire then move sideways onto a wider frontage, they unlimber on that frontage.

The illustration (left) shows three 12-gun batteries in the offensive fire phase after they unlimber, prior to extending their frontage. Battery 1 cannot extend to the left, as this is the middle of a wood, but it will not be able to fire in this phase at target A as most of the target is invisible from both hexes into which the battery can extend, due to the Russian infantry. Once it has extended, all else being unchanged, its left half would be able to fire at target A. Battery 2 can similarly fire at target B if it is to extend to the right, but it can only do that if the infantry there are weak enough to allow 6 guns to stack with them. If that is so, the infantry must, of course, move to the bottom of the stack when the battery extends and would not be able to fire in this phase because the guns are effectively already in front of them. If it is to extend to the left it may not fire at B this phase, but will be able to do so with its right half-battery next turn. Battery 3 cannot extend to its right because the forest there is fronted by a marsh for half of its width. If the marsh was not there the guns could be seen as extending around the front of the forest.

At two skirmishers per 5m an open hex would provide for 40 in action, though some crowding (as troops in action always do - it's a moral support thing), rotation of firing pairs and the provision of a local reserve will allow for the stacking shown on the table.

It is accepted that skirmishers be used for skirmishing only and the concentration of as many as possible in any hex is gamesmanship and illegal. With the restrictions on the offensive capabilities of skirmishers and their continued vulnerability to cavalry it should be evident to players that a thin screen is at the very least as good an idea as a stronger grouping.

Distance

The maximum distance column shows the limits for skirmishers. Similar limits for the previously unconsidered cavalry skirmishers, or piquets, are also given.

Formed units, previously unhindered in wandering the field, should keep to within a reasonable distance of their formation commander unless detached to a specific location. This distance is expressed in hexes. Any unit beyond the normal, BG stipulated, command distance will suffer morale and recovery penalties, but most units are allowed to exceed the given radii at their own risk. All maximum distances from their own formation are overridden by the next two columns, minimum distances from enemy units. Detached units sent orders by their formation commander will have to receive them by courier with the resulting delay, whereas units within command distance will be able to act on orders in the same turn.

The distance from enemy cavalry includes any "?" marker encountered but yet unidentified. Known enemy units which have fallen back from melee and, by a quirk of the BG system, become "?" markers do not fall into this category and are treated as their appropriate troop type. This means that if a "?" is encountered other units must treat it with the caution they would enemy cavalry and not home in to attack it from all sides.

Two numbers such as "2 / 7" are the distances skirmishers and piquets must keep from enemy formed units, or artillery from stronger infantry capable of a melee attack, from the flank and front respectively. In practice this means skirmishers and disrupted infantry may not enter or remain within enemy cavalry's charge threat zone or skirmishers within infantry close fire range.

Artillery in the open is required to keep 2 hexes away from threatening units, so must limber up to avoid losses in melee from an enemy unit facing it, capable of melee and at least 50% stronger than the artillery and any units stacked with it. The idea is to try to save at least some of the guns from a charge that looks likely to take all the guns. In BG melee, an unlimbered battery is completely lost on any "losing" result (since it cannot retreat), while a limbered one loses only whatever the loss result of the combat is, with the remaining guns surviving. If it looks like the enemy could melee at 3:2 odds, then generally the guns must limber rather than fire in their defensive phase, but the exception allowed by the rule is that at lower odds ratios, the player has the choice of firing or limbering, as he thinks most likely to save the guns - but that should be his consideration. Cover for artillery, in order to negate this rule, will be walls, embankments or fortifications, but not village, orchard or forest because the guns are considered to be deployed along the edge of such terrain.

Distances from cavalry are from any enemy cavalry, disordered or not, except piquets or routing units. There are several reasons behind this. Firstly the physical and moral presence of cavalry and its influence on the behaviour of infantry: without it the likes of Minden would be the rule rather than the exception. Infantry in line, or even column, did not manoeuvre at will in the face of brigades of enemy cavalry and would be defensive rather than offensive. Secondly, largely because of the alternate phase system of the game, the speed difference between foot and horse are best reflected in this way when at close quarters. Cavalry will tend to move off if threatened by close range fire and unable to do anything about it, and the infantry would not keep up with them (especially if firing). By advancing infantry to close range cavalry are denied this flexibility. The restriction also prevents the ridiculous surrounding of cavalry by infantry otherwise seen, just because their move phases are separate. Squares are not required to move away from cavalry. A currently disrupted state is not an excuse for infantry to approach as if in the hope that the enemy cannot reform and charge before the infantry manage to walk all the way back to a safer distance. Cavalry are for infantry to defend against, not to go after regardless of the difference in mobility and combat effectiveness. Cavalry did not remain standing long in
the presence of large bodies of enemy infantry in good order and are not permitted to do so in order to prevent the movement of enemy infantry by this rule.

Formed infantry may remain adjacent to enemy cavalry if the cavalry moved next to them and the cavalry are disrupted and facing away from them or if the cavalry are routed. Formed infantry may move to within less than the normal minimum distance from enemy cavalry if: the infantry are in good order and outnumber the cavalry and the cavalry are disrupted and have no room in which to retire and form up for a charge on regaining good order. In none of these cases can infantry move around cavalry in order to surround or cut them off with ZOCs.

Infantry firing at cavalry from 200m may move closer in the next move phase if the cavalry stand their ground, though not so as to block the cavalry's line of retreat. Any cavalry commander who chooses to stand and take musketry at any range deserves to suffer it at short range.

The minimum distance figures immediately provide the rule that skirmishers in the open may not stand in the face of formed infantry able to melee attack them. Generally, skirmishers, foot or mounted, fall back in the face of an advancing enemy as in "...the piquet affair of the Prussian General Ziethen, who had gallantly resisted the enemy's advance guard [in cover] .... but was driven back, or fell back, as all outposts do, as a matter of course." (An officer of Picton's Division).

The spirit of the skirmisher rules is therefore that they may not stand in the face of an advancing enemy, but must withdraw to some degree of safety such as cover or their own lines. Withdrawing one hex at a time would only be possible if in cover; but in the open, skirmishers must fall back to a covered position where available, to their parent formation, or otherwise as far as their move speed allows.

Infantry forming square against cavalry which moves out of sight may still consider that cavalry a threat unless and until it is known by them to have moved away. The stipulation of only being able to form square against cavalry visible to the infantry formation is intended to prevent square forming due to cavalry being visible to another formation. If, however, an adjacent formation forms square under legitimate threat, infantry not openly threatened might form square in the next turn by following the example and receiving word of the cavalry threat.

Initiating Melee

The 'May initiate melee against' column shows which enemy units may be attacked in close combat. The abilities of skirmishers in cover only goes as far as against disrupted enemy units or guns, or other skirmishers. Rare cases of ambushes and pursuit are catered for by this, though generally skirmishers will melee nothing but other skirmishers.

The 'May initiate melee against'
column shows which enemy units may be attacked in close combat. The abilities of
skirmishers in cover only goes as far as against disrupted enemy units or guns, or other
skirmishers. Rare cases of ambushes and pursuit are catered for by this, though generally
skirmishers will melee nothing but other skirmishers.

The meaning of the abbreviations and symbols in this column are:

• Sk : skirmishers
• D : disrupted enemy
• A : artillery
• N/A : not applicable

Attacking in melee 'in cover' means attacking into cover from cover; attacking 'in the open' means from an open hex, or into an open hex even if from cover.

Note that skirmishers may not assault into a hex such that a successful result will cause them to overstack.

7. In umpired wargames or those where players are recording battery ammunition usage, half of a light or field battery's ammunition is in the wagons, two thirds if heavy (12pdrs). Regimental guns are not subject to these restrictions.
British artillery could claim an advantage due to their carrying half an ammunition wagon's supply actually on the limber. This could allow them to use 60% of their ammunition without the wagons being nearby. This equates to 180 minutes of fire, or six 15-minute turns, or 18 5-minute turns. The phase(s) of fire using ready ammunition need not be immediately after unlimbering, but this requires a little more record keeping.

Cover

2. A 'building' hex can provide cover for 25 skirmishers to act as an outpost or isolated position. A greater number of skirmishers will operate in a building hex just as if in the open.

3. Linear cover is provided for in the rules as being more a moral than a physical support or obstacle and therefore once
breached or outflanked does not allow skirmishers to stand against formed enemy units. In an example where on 15th June 1815 Prussian infantry "skirmishers were placed behind hedges between the cannon to protect them" the hedges would not have given the skirmishers much protection by way of cover from fire. The reference is more to the
skirmishers protecting the guns, but they could not stand and do so in the face of an enemy advance without counting the hedges as cover. The same account tells of their exposure when their cover was outflanked by the enemy. On the following day:

"Lieutenant Hurtzig was deployed with his sharpshooters, men of the 1st Company, against some enemy skirmishers. The enemy were behind some bushes and trees, pouring deadly fire into our line, which was standing in the open with no cover. Nobody dared to attack this fire-spitting hedge, although troops of all types, English, Scottish and Hanoverians, were standing opposite it. The Lieutenant Hurtzig ordered his sharpshooters to storm the hedge, with Lieutenant von Hinüber promising to support the attack with part of the 1st Company. These two officers than placed themselves at the head of their men, who were at first deterred by the heavy enemy fire. Encouraged by the words of their officers, they charged the hedge and, with their supports, drove off the enemy.... Lieutenant Hurtzig led his men in another attack on the enemy skirmishers and drove them out of their next position, but , so as not to become surrounded, fell back to the first hedge..." (quoted in 1815 The Waterloo Campaign, P Hofschröer)

Such cover is therefore somewhat half way between true cover and open terrain, or a sort of staging position, in that only one defender needs to be forced out by melee or outflanking, with the threat of the same to the rest, in order for the defenders to be considered as in the open.

Isolated Units

2. To count as outnumbered, an isolated unit or stack must have all avenues of retreat or support blocked by a least an
equal number of enemy troops or their ZOCs. Thus 300 men would need a minimum of 300 in or facing each of the hexes adjacent to the surrounded unit, or such forces forming a visible barrier between them and their own lines. Skirmishers and piquets cannot contribute to a surrounding force unless the troops surrounded are themselves skirmishers or piquets (individual companies or squadrons).

To have cleared a path of retreat, the previously trapped units must be in the ZOC of, or share a hex with, friendly units with their further movement not prevented by enemy units or ZOCs.

3. If the number of prisoners captured is small it will be impossible for the captor to provide an escort as small as 20% their strength. As the smallest possible unit is 25 men, the smallest number of prisoners requiring a close escort is 125 (25 = 125 x 20%). Smaller bodies of POWs should be moved to a position where they can be seen by at least one of the captor's units and kept in sight at all times.

Skirmishers

The idea of light infantry retaining at least one third of their strength as a formed unit is to enable it to act as a base for the outlying companies. Players will rightly want to withdraw skirmishers who have run low on ammunition, become fatigued or disrupted. These can only recover from any of these problems if given at least one whole turn back as part of their parent unit. This is very generous when compared to the rate of fatigue recovery for formed units, which must remain inactive for at least two turns before even having a small chance of recovering from fatigue. Having a formed unit only one company in strength or less would allow one company to return, rest and recover only if no replacement company is immediately detached, otherwise the two companies are just changing places and the parent unit should now be as disrupted, fatigued and/or low on ammunition as the skirmishers were. Therefore a bare minimum of 33% in defence, when skirmishers might be less active, and 67% in the attack must form the unit providing replacements for withdrawn skirmish companies. The exception of allowing a lone light unit to provide a wide frontage of skirmishers by breaking down completely requires that it does not use a formed reserve for the same reason.

The four skirmisher elements in the village (A), each 50+ strong, will be in and among the buildings along the edges of the built up area. They cannot concentrate their fire in one direction, but have to choose a target through one hexside apiece. This looks like a case of another rule, of firing only at the nearest of most threatening target, being negated by another rule, but this is not so. Even though targets 1 and 4 are not a direct threat, they are the only targets available to two of the skirmishers, all of whom will therefore be firing at legitimate targets.

Cavalry

3. Cavalry must have space for splitting into squadrons and may not do so and have more than two squadrons remain together in one hex: if they are together as a unit they remain in one unit. A regiment with squadrons in line would cover 40-60m per squadron, so the main body should be in one hex with one or two squadrons (depending on the dividing factor in the PDT) in the adjacent hex.
Detaching one or two squadrons, for example, will allow a regiment to cover a greater frontage and approach the enemy from different angles by outflanking. It can also provide a reserve while the main body goes into action, in the form of a regiment in two separated lines. If taking on a lone enemy squadron, one squadron can be detached to fight it while the body of the regiment stands back. Splitting into squadrons just to provide more targets, suffer less from adverse morale checks or to recombine into one hex as many separate squadrons from different regiments as the stacking limit allows is gamesmanship and not allowed.

4. Cavalry piquets must be a minimum of three hexes apart to prevent the 'wall of ZOCs' effect. They would be there to observe, after all, and should cover as much frontage as possible anyway. Any light 'squadron' of less than 100 men will be considered a piquet and should act as one or recombine with the parent body.

Note that piquets are not capable of combat to any real extent and light cavalry if broken down into squadrons must stay close together as per heavy cavalry if it is to fight. In any event, light cavalry should not be seen as shock troops - they were not trained and did not expect themselves (the main point) to behave like heavies. They were also too valuable, particularly in the 'before and after' phases of scouting and pursuing. They will readily counter-charge enemy cavalry if threatened, of course.

The flexibility of dragoons can be reflected in them being treated like heavy cavalry when they behave like heavies, like lights when they are required to go scouting or watching a flank like lights. Thus a body of cavalry acts as a body and may fight effectively; piquets (which cannot be heavies) act sensibly and like any good reconnaissance patrol do not get involved in fighting.

5. The use of the charge phase by non-charging cavalry is an option to exercise the greater mobility of mounted units. The potential of the disruption caused by such a move remaining and inhibiting further actions is one to be weighed by the player when deciding whether and when to use this option. The only cavalry able to move at full speed in the charge phase are those actually charging into contact. Thus, any cavalry using more than 6 movement points in the charge phase is considered to be in a headlong charge and must melee one of the enemy occupied hexes contacted, though such a move might well be prevented by the next rule.

6. Suicidal charges by lone units, even lone squadrons, are intended to be prohibited by this rule. Only attacks with realistic prospects should be undertaken, not those simply to eliminate a gun battery or weak unit at 'affordable' cost. No cavalry should knowingly charge into a situation where it cannot hope to be effective. With rules 7 and 8, the requirement for an attacking force big enough to have an impact will encourage calculated manoeuvres rather than ad hoc, piecemeal attacks for limited favourable exchanges of losses.

7. Deciding not to overrun guns is avoiding allowing gun crews to take cover in adjacent units. Computers have rules like this, battlefields do not.

Fire Combat

1. Proportionate strengths can be taken into consideration. A small battery of four guns or fewer will occupy only half a hex frontage, permitting half the maximum number of infantry in column or 25 skirmishers to fire also. But this is really clutching at straws. The idea of having a hex grid is to define space for units to use as units. If a hex is used primarily by one unit it is best to avoid complications by placing any other units that want to shoot alongside in the next hex.

2. Skirmishers preclude any other unit firing from the same hex or behind, unless the skirmishers are 25 strong and the other unit is in column or half a battery. The average battalion in three ranks can be taken as covering a hex (or more). So in column of divisions a French battalion covers one third of this (2 company frontage, 3 divisions deep). Earlier in the war battalions were 8 companies, meaning a column one quarter of a line's frontage, but battalions tended to be bigger. A Russian column would have a frontage of one company, being a quarter of the battalion, which also tended to be bigger than French units at on-paper strength.
The most realistic solution, of course, is not to have infantry columns fire but deploy into line, their 'firepower' formation, first.

Two battalions in column would leave half or one third of the available frontage free. 40 skirmishers would cover a hex at text-book frontages, which might compact so that rather more men were involved. No unit can fire past artillery batteries of 5 or more guns, or infantry in line, because they effectively fill the hex width.

4. It is intended that no rules should preclude the possibility of anything physically possible. Hence the overhead fire rules are included to allow 'overhead fire' either when it is also 'direct fire' with no troops actually in the line of sight or flight because they are hidden from the firing guns but the target is not, or by howitzers. If potential targets can put themselves in dead ground it will be possible in some circumstances for friendly units to do so also. This is a tortuous subject open to abuse and deserves rules which constrain it to a point where it is far more practical to redeploy the guns than move the rest of the army into dead ground.

A typical cannon shot would spend more than half its flight-path below head-level, not merely the beginning and end - very flat trajectories were the rule with solid-shot cannon. The "1" firepower ranges on the table reflect the range for "ricochet" fire, as well - this means shots that bounced off the ground at least once before reaching the target. Even with a 2 level height difference, the area ahead of a firing battery would be far, far too dangerous for one's own troops to stand there. Half-burnt powder charges would also result in a number of "shorts", rounds that fall to the ground well before the intended range.

The proper tactical use of artillery in the Napoleonic era reflects this. Generally, the guns would be placed slightly ahead of the main position, sometimes concentrated in "grand batteries". Other batteries would manoeuvre with formations of both infantry and cavalry, in a "box"; around the battery, or in intervals left between the other troop types. From those positions, they could quickly unlimber protected by their accompanying troops, and fire from the gaps left between those formations, or when those formations moved to "unmask" them. Such close-range, suddenly unmasked use of batteries was sometimes devastatingly effective (e.g. General Thiebalt's supporting 12-pdr battery at Austerlitz).

Without the "no firing over your own men" rule, the use of artillery encouraged by the BG game system is the utterly unhistorical one of batteries on high ground well in the rear, firing at anything they please over the whole battlefield turn after turn, as though they are modern howitzers firing "on call" missions by radio. Rather, they are a direct-fire, flat-trajectory weapon best used at ranges of 800 yards or less, and place directly opposite the troops they are meant to hit, with nothing in between.

To allow for howitzers within a battery of guns, the 1 FP range and defensive phase only rule has the guns shooting half the time (they may not fire in the offensive fire phase) and only at targets not adjacent to friendly troops. The effectiveness reduction will be greater than just to halve the effect of a battery, because fire in the defensive phase only causes disorder on a failed morale check and does not cause rout results. It can still cause a few casualties and especially can still cause fatigue, though, which seems reasonable for the effect of shells from ¼ of the battery or less. It was wearing to stand under them for long periods, but not immediately panic-inducing.
All-howitzer batteries can fire overhead in the offensive fire phase, subject to target selection as above.

Firing only to cause fatigue, and cause such casualties as 1 fp lines can cause (with only rare disorder results added, against low-quality or tired troops e.g.) would not be a very economical use of available ammunition. But it could be done and may sometimes have an important tactical purpose (e.g. "shoo" cavalry away from some position to avoid loss, etc.). This restricts overhead fire to ranges 8-18, and with only defensive fire should limit the impact of it, as will firing "only half the time", effectively. Ammo usage considerations should be enough to restrict the practice of it too (provided the scenario is designed correctly as far as available ammo goes).

The ranges at which artillery fire is at 1 FP can be found in the fire effect chart in the games' parameter data. This can be
viewed via the 'Help' menu, 'Scenario Notes', or in our version here. A PDT is also a text file that can be viewed in any text editor.

5. The choice between nearest and more threatening enemies will vary from situation to situation. Cavalry may be considered a higher priority at greater distance than other targets only if they are poised to charge. Skirmishers are excluded because they would seldom be the subject of artillery or formed infantry fire. When skirmishers are firing, enemy skirmishers in greater strength than the unit concerned should, however, be considered a threat and subject to this rule.
The threat to be considered is that which is immediate, so that if one unit poses a threat visible now it takes priority over even a greater threat possible in the future. Men under fire or being approached by the enemy will react to that before considering whether another unit not facing them may later move around their flank. This is the principle of the diversionary or feint attack and those facing it, or a real attack, have to deal with it. Use your unengaged units or reserves to cover the flanks and other possible future threats.

The example (left) shows an artillery battery, A, presented with two possible targets at equal ranges. While target 1 presents the 'better' target as a dense column, the greater threat is from target 2, which if not actually already firing at the gunners is in a position to do so or advance and close assault them. The argument that the column is a potential threat because it may turn, or oust the skirmishers from the wood and come to bear on the battery's flank, is rather spurious in that it deals with future possibilities, whereas the line is a current as well as a future threat. See also some notes on counter-battery fire and other artillery tactics

Road Movement

Road movement problems are partly avoided in NHWC wargames by the fact that roads offer little movement benefit in otherwise open ground, so units can be considered as being in combat formation. Roads and paths have to be considered if their movement benefit is being used to move through close terrain. To avoid having to apply these rules, move at the right speed for the terrain and consider all units as in combat formation, or like most forces engaging the enemy just don't use the roads!

1. The difference between road column and any combat formation is distinct, though not accounted for in the BG system. It is, unrealistically, possible to be in road column and be attacked without ill effect; the least we can do is prevent offensive action in this formation. Overall, road movement is not something to undertake in close proximity to the enemy.

2. The required gaps between certain units may not be closed up in any turn during which road movement is used, even if the units end their turn off-road. This is because a formation change, as noted above, is required before a unit is capable of combat after marching in road column.

If a unit moves on a road and uses more than half speed including the road bonus it is in road column for that turn. It can move through road hexes but not move more than 6 hexes (modified by other terrain) and will not then be in road column but can fight and stack as normal. Any unit using a bridge or ford must be in road column and will not have stopped to change formation if it moves so as to allow other units to follow it. Other formation changes take half a turn to perform, so changing from road column to another formation should do so also.

The amount of road required by a unit is a simple calculation based on infantry and cavalry being four abreast, guns and wagons head-to-tail. This produces the following column lengths:

Infantry in fours = 270m per thousand men, or 370 per hex

Cavalry in fours = 750m per thousand, or 133 per hex

Artillery = 550m for a 6 piece battery, 750 for 8. This would include all supply vehicles, which in a tactical situation must be available within a few hundred metres for replenishing ammunition as needed when the battery is deployed. Using the NHWC modification of having artillery trains makes batteries fill this road space better.

(Source for the above figures: The Waterloo Campaign, A Nofi)

Note that the 'gaps' between the unit graphics when stretched along a road are not gaps at all, but are filled with the rest of that unit's column. So other units may not cross the road at these points nor use them in a line of fire as though they are empty.

The number of troops able to pass through a point can be found based on the predominant troop type, indicated in the table below. Mixes of more than two types and the addition of wagons can be readily worked out as round numbers are good enough for our purposes.

Ready reckoner for unit road-column lengths

Road column and changing formation

Like any other formation, road column would take time to form into and out of, from and to other formations - combat column, line or square. Each change of these other formations is handled by BG as taking half a turn to complete, so it seems right to include road column in a similar way, even though it is not included in the game engine. As no evident change takes place between road and combat column within the game, the change of formation must be voluntarily controlled by the players, road movement limited to half speed to allow time for the change and the change declared if in sight of the enemy.

Currently, units using road movement are considered as being in road column for the entire turn and incapable of fighting, though changing to combat formation between turns is taken for granted at no movement cost. The latter should be eliminated and speed in one turn or the other reduced to allow for the formation change. If off the road, or not requiring the road bonus, in the next turn a unit can be declared as changing to combat column if it moves at half speed or less. The change should also be possible in the second half of the same turn in which road movement is used, also restricting speed to half that possible, including half the road bonus (i.e. each road hex counts as 2MP instead of 1MP).

The need for this is most likely when crossing a defile or passing through restrictive terrain, such as would disrupt a unit not in road column, in the face of the enemy, requiring a change to combat formation on the other side. If a unit only uses half its move to cross the obstacle it will obviously have half a turn's worth of movement to change formation. If doing so and declaring the fact to the opposition, or to the umpire in campaign wargames, the unit will be able to fire and assault in subsequent phases of the same turn. Failing to declare a change of formation, or using more than half speed on the road, will mean the unit is still in road column and cannot fire or assault until the following turn. Units following behind one that changes formation from road column have the option of closing up behind it or of using half speed themselves and also declaring a change to combat formation.

Changing into road column should be handled the same way, allowing half speed in either the turn before or the same turn as using road movement. The change would again have to be declared to the umpire, or to the opposition if in sight. The umpire would inform any opposing players in sight of the change.

Fatigue

1. Horses have minds of their own and blown cavalry horses will not be as easily controlled as fresh ones and will not charge even if their riders want them to. When withdrawn from action, it will be appreciated that their brigade commander and other units in his command should remain with them to facilitate recovery from fatigue and to satisfy the maximum separation distance requirement on the Rules Table.

Supply wagons, pioneers, leaders & routed units

Leaders illegally eliminated are compensated for by reducing their side's losses by 100 if a brigade commander or colonel, 250 if a division commander or equivalent. If it is the C-in-C it will probably be necessary to play the phase again, though the loser of this commander may settle for 1000 casualties being removed from his total. These totals are of course also added to losses of the side transgressing, as for other illegal losses.

BG's Optional Rules

Cavalry counter-charges - it is a well known fact that no competent cavalry commander would allow his unit to be caught at the halt. Those forced into this situation by enemy manoeuvre, limited visibility or bad luck would find themselves at a severe disadvantage. They should certainly not be prohibited from such a basic cavalry manoeuvre by leaving out an optional rule.

Rout limiting - the stacking limits are designed for formed units in formation; an area 100m across could hold far more men than this limit if they forego their interval-keeping. Passing through a friendly unit to get onto the 'safe' side of it would seem to be a natural thing for routing men to do, if possible, only those being left behind in the rush would necessarily fall into enemy hands.

Flank morale modifiers - the benefit of having a unit covering one or each flank is self evident: the flank is covered. Adding to this benefit of sensible tactics can lead to bad tactics, like ranging endless units in line abreast regardless of anything else just to get this benefit. There is no reason to suppose that the individuals in a unit would have better morale for having units alongside, as most of them wouldn't know they were there. 100m across a smoky, noisy battlefield can be a long way, especially when there are other distractions, like the enemy. Private Atkins is not going to be looking over his shoulder and feeling better for 'knowing' where adjacent units are. There are plenty of ways of covering a unit's flank: use of a reserve or refused flank, threat of or actual counter-attack, use of terrain, etc. A factor in a computerised game isn't even on the list.

Fog of War - even when set to 'Extreme', this option barely reflects the level of visibility on the battlefield, through the smoke and milling units to be identified as friendly or enemy. Any lesser setting is therefore inappropriate. In good visibility the following identifications could be expected at given ranges:

• 1500m - Infantry discernible from cavalry.
• 1200m - Artillery batteries countable. Overall strength calculable. Quality of troops suggested by the 'smartness' of units.
• 800m - Movements and activities of units.
• 600m - Groupings of files confirms numbers and organization. General direction of movement of formations can be seen.
• 450m - Individual leaders and skirmishers visible, identity of units possible based on headdress shape and uniform colours.
• 300m - Designs on flags and uniforms clear.

(Source for the above figures: The Waterloo Campaign, A Nofi)

Line movement restriction - infantry could and did move and fight in line. It was the basic formation for units and sub-units in all armies for over two centuries; the 'columns' used by most continental armies were composed of companies or divisions in line arranged behind one-another. The difference in manoeuvrability between the two formations would be small over open terrain, which is already reflected in their different movement rates, and the effects of broken ground are more than adequately reflected in the disruption caused to units in line.

Sub-division into skirmishers and piquets

Reproducing sub-units of the correct strength for all unit types in two opposing armies is something of a forlorn cause in Battleground. This is because all infantry share one denominator by which their strength is divided when creating skirmishers; all cavalry similarly use one figure to create squadrons. It is at least as effective to create sub units of a minimum strength that can then be combined in various combinations to reach as near to the company/squadron strength as possible. If the dividing figure is sufficiently high, a battalion of 200 in four companies can use four sub-units of 25 to represent a company, while another of 600 in eight companies can combine three elements of 25 to form one of its companies. A common denominator of 6 would never reflect this.

For a unit to create sub-units the divisor used for creating them must be less than or equal to the strength points value (PV) of the unit. PV is the strength in men divided by 25 and is the strength figure appearing in the OOB file. This can place quite a low upper limit on the denominator used, but there are ways of increasing the number possible.

Any unit with a PV below the denominator will be unable to create skirmishers or squadrons. In some cases this will be appropriate, such as the single squadrons or companies of Gendarmes, Marines and Mamelukes that appear, particularly in Eylau. Heavy cavalry are unlikely to need to send out separate squadrons and for most small units it would be tactically unwise or at least unnecessary to deploy the resulting tiny sub-units, too weak to influence matters in most cases.

To enable small units to create sub-units when a high denominator is in use, one of two methods can be used.

1. Unit strengths in the OOB file can all be made at least the same PV as the denominator, but with actual, lower, strength being retained in the scenario. Units with higher PVs than field strength will show as being of 'reduced strength' in the game and unable to deploy skirmishers if line infantry (such as type I in the OOB). This will not be a problem for reasons detailed below.

2. Small units that are parts of the same regiment can be combined in the OOB to create one unit of higher strength. This is not ideal in that it changes the game's OOB from the historical one and it certainly should not be used for units of different regiments or different quality ratings.

If no small units are in use, the denominator can be made quite high without resorting to either of these methods but, if one is necessary, the first is preferable.

One problem with the system of increasing the OOB strength in difference to the field strength is that reinforcements in BG always arrive at the full OOB strength. The remedy for this is for the player, or umpire, to separate off the required number of skirmishers as soon as the unit arrives, bringing it down to the proper strength. These detachments can be removed from the map immediately, taking no part in the battle.

A denominator of 9 will cause units to be split into up to 10 parts (main body the same strength as the 9 sub-units), with a minimum unit strength of 225 (PV=9). This is a good figure to use for infantry because an average sized battalion, or 450-600 men, will create skirmisher elements of 50 each. Two or three of these would represent a whole company, but 50 is the ideal size for skirmishers covering the frontage of an open terrain hex. Elements can always be combined to reach up to an upper strength limit, one can never be split to get below it.

Line infantry with large companies will need to be able to deploy more than one element to represent their capability. All infantry able to deploy any skirmishers should therefore be made light infantry in type, allowing them to deploy unlimited elements. This has the added advantage of permitting line infantry to use skirmishers even after taking losses. The BG limit of skirmishers only from full strength line units is unrealistic in that it prevents their deployment even if only 25 men have been lost. It does require players to use restraint in using skirmishers from line infantry, especially for units or nationalities of limited capability. If a line battalion has already deployed skirmishers up to its normal capability it should not be permitted to send out any more, whether the original skirmishers have been lost or are still in action.

The sub-unit strengths derived from each denominator can be seen in the table below, illustrating unit strengths in round hundreds.

From this, the average sized units can be seen to create elements of 50 if a denominator of between 9 and 12 is used. In Eylau, with several very strong French units, a higher denominator is preferable, although this will require greater modification to OOB strengths for the many small Russian Eger units (their line infantry cannot deploy skirmishers so are not affected).

Some examples of company make-up from small elements

The formation of two elements to represent a light company as skirmishers enables a unit to cover its front and more. This is particularly realistic in allowing two or three battalions from a brigade or even division to provide enough elements to screen all hexes in front of the formation, as was often the case. In a system where only one element per battalion is possible several, perhaps all, battalions have to detach them to provide this cover. The realistic ability to reinforce the skirmish line or rotate elements to rest and replenish ammunition is therefore maintained without weakening the combat units to any great extent.

Small skirmisher elements will have little chance of causing damage through fire combat. This is partly negated by their being available in greater numbers, but the fire effect table in the PDT file can be modified to allow greater effect at the lowest end of the range. NHWC wargames already have this, giving greater chances of causing fatigue but fewer actual casualties. The main role of skirmishers was not to destroy enemy units by fire anyway: they shield their formation and prevent the enemy from doing the same by defeating their skirmishers.

Overall, it seems that an infantry denominator of 12 provides sub-units of 25 or 50 in most cases while requiring a minimal amount of revision to OOB strengths (to a minimum of 300 per unit). Even if piquets rather than squadrons are to be used, cavalry can have a smaller denominator, though this is not necessary if most units are 300 or thereabouts, giving sub-units of 25 for most cavalry, which are ideal as piquets.