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Infantry Tactics

It is not intended to cover here minor details of weapon characteristics, little used tactics or particulars of drill and sub-unit formations. Rather, in the light of the fact that several wargamers have admitted to little knowledge of tactics and difficulty in obtaining information to help them, these notes are intended to assist in understanding the realities behind the game rules and applying realistic tactics to wargaming within the Battleground game system.

Common misconceptions
or things you might like to forget

It seems to be an assumption that the more glorious cavalry or the more damaging artillery were the major tactical tools on the Napoleonic battlefield, with infantry playing a truly pedestrian, unglamorous and less decisive role. This period has also engendered a myth that says shock of impact, with the bayonet, was the conclusion and decider of every assault. This is perhaps because of the predominance of the depiction of attacks by infantry in close column having some sort of impetus that carried them through thin defending lines or somehow enabled their running rings around opposing columns, though the fact that fire from lines regularly defeated columns should have dispelled this. Not least in promoting this view among users of Battleground-type games is the game system itself, with fifteen-minute alternate turns in which one side moves and the other can do nothing. The whole idea of the assault is also promoted by the game because it has the potential to gain an extra 100m of ground and completely dislodge a defender, it is permitted to disrupted and fatigued units and even by those outnumbered by the defenders - for the false tactical gain of disrupting them regardless of cost to the attacking unit.

Line formation is sometimes seen as belonging to the British infantry (successfully) or outdated continental armies (unsuccessfully), used perhaps secondarily by other armies all of which attacked and defended in column. Fire combat can be seen in many a BG game being used by columns, even those weak, disrupted and against long-range and unsuitable targets, in every available fire phase for little gain and less attention to realism or common sense. Largely ignored is that fact that there was a strict discipline involved in fire tactics, linked to limited ammunition, troops' fatigue, weapon characteristics, battlefield conditions and command control.

Due to the quirks (I am inclined to say perversities) of the BG turn system, infantry are perceived as being at least as manoeuvrable as cavalry and, though precluded from actually assaulting horsemen, can chase them around the battlefield, encircle and enfilade them while the cavalry must wait their turn to move. Defensively, the square is seen rightly to be the best formation, but its disadvantages and vulnerability are easily ignored, though because of those it would not be adopted in reality unless the cavalry threat was very real.
Skirmishers seem to be a favourite of many gamers, probably because they give so many fire opportunities and are used to block enemy moves. The game permits them to gang together in densities of more than two men per metre whereas the correct deployment was one fifth of that.
The NHWC game rules are intended to allay these and other misconceptions, prompting realistic tactics and historical accuracy. As a corollary, therefore, use of good tactics and a sense of what is realistic will fall within the rules quite automatically.

Infantry on the battlefield

The great mass of all armies were comprised of foot soldiers who invariably suffered the heaviest casualties and usually decided the outcome of battle. The bulk were infantry of the line, though this category can be subdivided. In most armies, at least in theory, grenadiers were chosen from the strongest and bravest men and light companies from agile good shots. Guards formations were of superior morale, trained to a high standard or chosen from the experienced and proven elite of the army. Light infantry, as whole units, were supposedly like the light companies, though the French and their allies who emulated their organisation made light battalions little different from the line infantry, though they could well be of slightly higher morale due to a certain (if unfounded) esprit de corps. All the above would habitually fight in close order, about 22"-25" (56-64cm) per man of frontage, two or three ranks in depth. Light companies would act with the true light infantry units - whether chasseurs, voltigeurs, jägers - to form a screen for the main formations, clear or defend difficult terrain and use galling fire to disrupt enemy attack or defence.
Close-formed infantry in battle were the only troops who could both take and hold ground, particularly close terrain or over difficult obstacles. They would often assume the routine, but vital, occupation of positions, static roles, digging of works, mounting guards and manhandling of guns and vehicles. Artillery without infantry were vulnerable to enemy troops, particularly cavalry. Cavalry without infantry could threaten, charge and pursue, but could not take or hold a town or wood nor defend anything - even themselves - by any means other than avoidance or counter-attack.

Infantry weapons

Firepower was the principle weapon of the infantry. The musket, not the bayonet, was the first- and most-employed weapon, most effective, damaging and decisive. Even in modern armies an aura still surrounds the bayonet, the flashing foot or more of bright steel (now dwindled to a stubby bottle-opener of dull metal). Its introduction at the turn of the eighteenth century changed the composition of units, making the musketeer his own defender against cavalry and able to carry out a close assault on the rare occasion it was needed. The first uses of formalised bayonet drill were defensive, such as in seeing off the Highlanders' wild charge at Culloden. In the American revolution, the advantage of the regulars with bayonets over the locals without them was more psychological than physical, but as Napoleon is reported to have said that the ratio of those factors is three to one, this was a significant edge.
The effect of the bayonet continued to be more on the mind and will of the opposition than on their physical wellbeing. The number of bayonet wounds reported in comparison to other battle casualties was minute and anyone witnessing the actual crossing of blades in combat would remark on the extreme rarity of the event. Some, such as George Guthrie, asserted that formed regiments "charging with the bayonet never meet and struggle hand to hand and foot to foot; and this for the best possible reason, that one side turns and runs away as soon as the other comes close enough to do mischief". General Lejeune said that bayonet encounters were "very rare in modern warfare, for as a rule one of the corps is demoralised by the firing, and draws back before the enemy is near enough to cross muzzles".

Lejeune's indication of firepower being the decider is significant. Musketry was the main means of inflicting damage available to the infantry as well as having a moral effect of its own. Being under fire would cause a unit to fire back, attempt to charge or to retire. It would not be ignored, certainly not in order to fire at another unit not firing or even threatening, such as the 'cheating' flank shots seen in so many wargames. Units under threat of or taking damage will react to it, positively or negatively according to circumstance.
Theoretical rate of fire for muskets with cylindrical ramrods and conical touchholes could be as rapid as one shot per 11-12 seconds, or 5-6 rounds per minute. Fouling of barrels, need to change flints, smoke obscuration and other delays (including a 3-second delay between sub-unit volleys to allow words of command to be heard) reduced the effective rate of fire to 4-5 rounds per minute or lower. This is the rate taken to mean firing in the Offensive Fire phase of the game. The more rapid rate, used in emergencies and only when possible, includes fire in the Defensive Fire phase also. This is why fire in this phase is limited to close range, threatening targets or from units in good order line formation with good targets in clear view.

Unit formations

The infantry formations used on the battlefield in the eighteenth century were designed so that each man could use his firearm or sidearm (sabre) effectively in any situation. The Napoleonic column, with its phalanx-like shape, was a departure from this principle and was a measure borne of necessity during the French Revolutionary wars, when the half-trained French recruits were not capable of carrying out the demanding evolutions in line without falling into disorder and confusion.
The tactics used in any age are dictated by the weapons available. The rate of fire and effective ranges of muskets, cannon and howitzers in the eighteenth century led logically to the development of the line as the normal infantry combat posture.
Because firepower was primary, the line was the preferred formation for close combat. Moving to that situation was usually carried out in column, but deployment on or preferably just before the objective was the normal practice, intended to bring the maximum number of muskets to bear. "British line v. French column", with the line standing still while the column marched straight into it, wasn't the intended tactic of either side or the expected result of an infantry attack. The clash of the two formations was rather the result of the use of terrain in defending a ridge and advancing to fire on the column before it could deploy. One of the most famous instances of this was at Waterloo, where the huge columns of d'Erlon's corps were caught in the act of deploying by infantry and cavalry resulting in their complete defeat and pursuit to the gun line of the grand battery.

If firepower were all that mattered, there would be no reason for the column persisting as a tactical formation, but there are two other considerations. The first is that columns were best preceded by sufficient skirmishers and only directed at infantry lines which had been previously weakened at the intended point of impact by prolonged, concentrated artillery fire. This makes use of the moral effect on battered and harried units of a mass of troops advancing rapidly to the attack, an effect so profound, if conducted well, that the enemy often 'gave way whenever a French column came within a certain distance of them, and the French generals never experienced much difficulty in bringing their columns to this critical point'. It was in seeking this point, difficult to gauge with defenders behind the terrain, where French columns usually came under the fire of British lines or cavalry, as related above.
The second rationale for using columns is maintenance of formation. Some commanders may have intended to press the assault in column, such as Gerard at Albuera and others, but under heavy fire and confined by other units it may have been impossible to deploy. Sometimes deployment seems to have been as much a matter of individual or sub-unit initiative as command oriented intent, leading to confusion and defeat if faced by a steady line. Choosing the moment of deployment was therefore crucial and this remains true in the wargame. Unless the terrain is prohibitive, deploying too early is preferable to deploying too late, for the threat of close range enemies can produce exactly the disorder seen in reality, while not deploying at all has the above mentioned firepower penalties. If an assault were to come to the point of the bayonet, the line was still the best formation to be in, because, just as it presented the maximum number of musket muzzles for fire, each of those muzzles had a bayonet affixed and made the greater number available for close combat too.

"The column is no doubt excellent for all movements short of the actual charge, but... the close column will be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns which blinded by smoke, unstedfast (sic) of footing, and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion: no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head [of the column], which is often firm, and even victorious the moment the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well managed columns are the very soul of military operations, in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists of knowing when and where to extend the front." [Napier]

It is a pity that BG makes lines automatically disrupted by minor obstacles like hedges, as they were not really that cumbersome or difficult to keep in order. Firstly, the officers and men were, usually, trained to do just that and did so on a regular basis. Also, even a battalion in column was in fact a series of companies in line, each operating as a sub-unit while also part of the whole. Some manoeuvres were actually easier to complete in line than in column. Changing facing to a flank was a case of forming on a right- or left-marker with companies falling into the new line in turn. A column turning to a flank would have to wheel as a whole or by the leading companies forming first followed by other companies in succession.

Fire and movement

Due to the limited range of muskets, fire and movement combinations for a single unit were restricted mainly to one well aimed and prepared-for volley at 40-80 paces, followed at once by a bayonet charge. The bayonet charge was the deciding factor, in succeeding by forcing the defenders to retire or failing due to lack of morale of a faltering attack. The fire would therefore ideally be given before the enemy had the chance to fire, to affect the return volley with confusion, smoke and shock effects. Continuous volley fire was likely to be of less effect due to the large amount of smoke, decreasing carefulness in loading and aiming, fouling of weapons, misfire rate and casualties among the firers.
In the 1790s the Prussians had a system of advancing at a slow, short pace with alternate platoons making three long, rapid paces, firing and reloading while the remainder caught up. Austrian regulations called for manoeuvre in the proximity of the enemy to be carried out in two halves, one firing while the other moved.
All this comes down to the same thing in game terms: units may fire and move but fire effect is reduced by the modifier for moving units. The most effective fire is from units standing to receive an attack. Firing during the assault was often frowned upon, for reasons such as loss of impetus, difficulty in getting the unit to advance again and, if attacking a naturally defensive or fortified position, the 'absurdity of firing at stone walls'. Against such positions close assault might be required if forced to attack them, though manoeuvre to avoid and surround them seems the best option.
When receiving a cavalry charge, infantry were to hold their fire until the horsemen were 40 paces away and then fire a battalion volley. It was not unknown for steady infantry, in line in the open, to repel cavalry with fire. After the effects of the volley it would be difficult for the cavalrymen to urge their horses into a solid line of bayonets. The difference made by square formation was to provide this kind of front all-round, with no flanks for cavalry to exploit.
The use of cover from artillery fire was recommended to commanders, but little in this respect is mentioned in battle accounts, except where the British were concerned. Most continental armies were apt to deploy on open, forward slopes where they presented generous targets. The use of deep formations would exacerbate this, also preventing a ploy by troops in line formation whereby files could open in the line of visibly approaching roundshot to allow them to pass through harmlessly. Having troops lie down also reduced the possibility of casualties, but the only sure way of suffering least from enemy fire was to keep out of sight.
Regimental guns, nominally two 3pdrs or 4pdrs, were reintroduced to the French army in late 1809. They were manned by infantrymen with scant training and operated very much as part of the infantry and not in batteries. Their accompanying the infantry, and the infantry's reciprocal responsibility for and some reliance on them, had some stultifying effect on tactics and in some ways a return to the staid ways of the ancien regime that the Revolutionary armies had overthrown with their free, energetic battlefield manoeuvres. These guns lasted into the Russian campaign, where nearly all were lost and not replaced. Most other countries had abandoned regimental guns, but the Russians continued to use their divisional light batteries in close support of the infantry, for more of which see the page on artillery tactics.

Withdrawal

This has always been the manoeuvre most fraught with danger. It was essential to exercise tight control over the formation to prevent degeneration into confusion and rout.
The best method was to have alternate units march a given distance to the rear, halt and face about while the remainder held their position and prevented the enemy from attacking any unit in the flank or rear. Once the now rearward half of the formation had faced up, the forward line would march back through them to take a position a similar distance to their rear. Battalions would carry this manoeuvre out in steps of 100m or so, though in a game turn they should move as far as possible while still being able to turn about (75% of their move in the latest NHWC pdt).

Brigade formations

Until quite recently before the Napoleonic period, brigading of battalions had been an ad hoc business, units being placed under a general officer as the need arose and seldom remaining together from one action to the next. The development of more permanent brigades, then divisions and finally corps was in recognition of some important facts. The increasing size of armies made them unmanageable for any one man to command without these graduated sub-formations, each serving together under a general officer on a long-term basis. The esprit de corps engendered by this arrangement made these brigades and divisions all the more effective as they lived, marched, trained and fought together, sometimes over a period of several years.
Just as it was important for a unit to take up a formation appropriate to its role, the arrangement of the units in a brigade would vary according to the brigade's current mission. Some armies used the regiment as this step in their organisations, with Prussian brigades being equivalent to other armies' divisions in the period 1812-15. Russian regiments fielded three battalions each up to 1807 and these operated together as a formation like a brigade.

Higher formations

See also: How to deploy a Prussian brigade on the BG battlefield

Examples of division formations

Two brigades in echelon, or left flank refused

The left-rear brigade of Russians acts as a reserve to the leading one, protects the flank of the assault and can be committed to exploit the leading brigade's success, cover its failure or attack alongside.

"1-up" and "2-up"

The addition of a third brigade to the echelon creates either a leading centre brigade with strong reserves ("one-up", above) or leading flanks with a smaller central reserve ("two-up", below). The third brigade could otherwise be added to the refused flank, resulting in one flank leading with a strong reserve en echelon. The permutations are many and can be adapted to the terrain, opposition encountered and other local conditions. Each 3-battalion Russian brigade in these examples is "two-up", but these could equally be "one-up", in line or echelon as circumstances require.

The obvious common feature of these formations is the use of a reserve, in each case about one third of the total strength, though this may vary between one quarter and two thirds of the available units. A strong reserve may be preferable if other threats are expected, such as counter-attack (particularly on a flank), or if strong secondary defences are to be tackled once the enemy's first line has been breached. In any case, economy of force - using what is required and no more - avoids the unnecessary disruption of units and formations, dissipating strength in the initial contact. Therefore echelon or "one-up" would be more appropriate against relatively weak defenders, while "two-up" might be best against a strong position.

Two names in the Battleground lexicon particularly demonstrate this important tactic: the usefulness and sometime necessity of trading ground for time, casualties or tactical advantage. A look at the maps of Eylau and Quatre Bras showing the situation about half way through the original proceedings reveal the attackers, French in each case, having reached positions well up the battlefield, apparently in the process of sweeping the fields entirely. But in neither case was that the result. Nor were these positions reached by the French battling every enemy unit over every yard of ground at the point of the bayonet. Anyone attempting to contest, as the Russians at Eylau, every possible position with every possible unit will find themselves reaching the 35% casualty limit by early afternoon. In reality, the Russians had no real tactical choice other than retiring from Davout's flanking attack, to retain at least some of their cohesion and in many cases their lives. "Hanging the army out to dry" in a line of defence of the indefensible and inconsequential only leads to losses from the firepower of the larger, better French units. Careful withdrawal using the terrain and reserve formations keeps the pressure off any one formation, keeps casualties down and preserves formations for the necessary counter-attack when the Prussians arrive.
At Quatre Bras, the Netherlands troops are incapable of holding any of the ground they stand on at the start of the action or at least, if they do, it is likely to be the last ground they ever hold. They should end up back at the crossroads, just as the Eylau Russians should be the wrong side of Kulschitten, because, unless the attack is very inept or very unfortunate, it is the only wise tactical method if the army is to live to fight another day or even later the same day.
The idea of having to hold on to ground in order to win is a false one (with a few exceptions where a particular feature is of undeniable importance for tactical reasons). In BG it seems to go hand in hand with two other notions commonly seen in wargamers but impossible to justify in historical reality (again, with rare exceptions not usually in the open field). One is the "take as many of them with us" idea: sacrificing units in the hope of causing at least as much damage to the enemy as they can inflict. This is readily countered with the use of effective firepower, which enables such defenders to achieve their objective of dying where they stand but only taking an amount of expended ammunition with them.

The second false tactical idea here is "it's a bridge/farm/wood/hill/etc., it must be important". Terrain features only have significance in a battle if they are part of a tactical plan, though there can be features that must be part of any plan. NHWC scenarios do not use objective points because it is up to the commander on the day to decide what his objectives are. Any plan for Waterloo that is successfully completed without a shot fired at Hougoumont makes that place as insignificant as an 'objective' as any open hex.

Sources
Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, 1978/1997
von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic Era, 1979
Haythornthwaite, Napoleonic Infantry, 2001